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FAMILY STATUS, SEXUALITY AND
"THE PROVINCE OF THE JUDICIARY":




The Supreme Court decision in Mossop amounts to a postponement
of, rather than a precedent on, the issue of whether the exclusion of
gay and lesbian families from employment benefits is a violation of
current anti-discrimination law. The author argues that the Court
managed to avoid the issue by departing from its well-established
tradition of giving generous, dynamic and purposive interpretations
to human rights statutes. He also questions the accuracy of the Court's
assertion of superior judicial expertise on anti-discrimination law. In
the area of gay rights, Supreme Court justices have shown themselves
to be disinclined to take on the responsibilities that such expertise
ought to entail.
Le statut familial, la sexualit6 et "le domaine de la
magistrature," les suites de Mossop c. I'A.-G. du
Canada
Le jugement de la Cour supreme dans Mossop equivaut a diffrrer,
plut6t qu'a trancher, la question de savoir si le refus des avantages
sociaux aux familles gaies et lesbiennes enfreint la loi contre la
discrimination. L 'auteur prtend que la Cour a su eviter cette question
en negligeant sa tradition bien itablie de donner aux statuts concer-
nant les droits de Ia personne une interpretation genereuse, dy-
namique et reflichie. D 'autre part, il n 'est pas persuade que la Cour
puisse arguer de son expertise judiciaire superieure dans le domaine
de la loi contre la discrimination. Pour ce qui est des droits des gais,
en effet, les juges de la Cour supreme se sont montrs peu enclins b
assumer les responsabilits qui accompagneraient une telle expertise.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the case of Mossop v. A.-G. Canada,' the Supreme Court had its
first opportunity to develop the human rights of lesbians and gay men
since its 1979 decision in Gay Alliance Toward Equality v. Vancouver
Sun2 (hereinafter "Gay Alliance"). The case involved a complaint by
Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. The author
would like to thank John Evans, Didi Herman, Peter Hogg, Mary Jane Mossman,
Sid Peck and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on an earlier
draft.
[1993] 1 S.C.R. 554.
2 [1979] 2 S.C.R. 435.
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a federal government employee, Brian Mossop, under the Canadian
Human RightsAct. Mossop alleged that the government discriminated
against him on the prohibited ground of family status by denying him
paid bereavement leave to attend the funeral of his gay partner's father.
Mossop is the first case to have arrived at the Supreme Court in a wave
of litigation initiated by lesbian or gay couples across the country
seeking to employ anti-discrimination law to challenge their exclusion
from laws or policies that confer benefits or rights on family members.
Lower courts and human rights tribunals were divided when Mos-
sop was heard (and continue to be divided) on the question of whether
disadvantaging treatment of lesbian or gay couples amounts to dis-
crimination on the basis of marital status, family status or sexual ori-
entation. Much of the existing case law rejecting complaints of dis-
crimination is characterized by convoluted logic and a frequently
alarming degree of ignorance regarding gay and lesbian lives. These
features of the case law appear to be bound up with a resistance to
conceptualizing the legal regulation of sexuality and family structures
as equality issues. On the other hand, the case law upholding com-
plaints of discrimination has tentatively acknowledged the reality and
value of gay and lesbian relationships and has sought to overcome
their devaluation by current laws and practices. These tentative steps
towards affirmation often have been accompanied by a problematic
assimilationist rhetoric. That is, courts and tribunals have suggested
that gay and lesbian couples are deserving of legal recognition to the
extent that they conform to a mythologized heterosexual norm.3
Given the uncertain, shifting and highly politicized legal terrain up-
on which the Mossop case arrived at the Supreme Court, it is perhaps
not surprising that a 4-3 majority of the Supreme Court opted for a
decision that amounted to a creative postponement of an engagement
with the question of gay family status. The majority held that it did
not need to determine whether gay or lesbian couples have a family
status for the purposes of current anti-discrimination law. In its view,
under the state of the law at the time of Mossop's complaint, it was
clear that Parliament did not intend to provide protection to gay or
3 There now exists a rich and diverse body of work in the Canadian legal literature
that seeks to grapple with the theoretical and practical contradictions of the
struggle of gay and lesbian litigants for legal recognition of their relationships.
See, for example, D. Herman, "Are We Family?: Lesbian Rights and Women's
Liberation" (1990) 28 Osgoode Hall L.J. 789; N. Duclos (lyer), "Some Com-
plicating Thoughts on Same-Sex Marriage" (1991) 1 L. & Sexuality 31; D.
Herman, "'Sociologically Speaking': Law, Sexuality and Social Change" (199 1)
2 J. of Human Just. 57; B. Ryder & B. Cossman, Gay, Lesbian andi Unmarried
Heterosexual Couples and the Family Law Act: Accommodating a Diversity of
Family Forms (Ontario Law Reform Commission, 1993); S. Gavigan, "Paradise
Lost, Paradox, Revisited: The Implications of Familial Ideology for Feminist,
Lesbian and Gay Engagement to Law" (1993) 31 Osgoode Hall L.J. (forth-
coming); B. Cossman, "Family Inside/Out" (1994) 44 U.T.L.J. 1; J. Freeman,
"Defining Family in Mossop v. D.S.S.: The Challenge of Anti- Essentialism and
Interactive Discrimination for Human Rights Litigation" (1994) 44 U.T.L.J. 41;
D. Herman, Rights of Passage: Struggles for Lesbian and Gay Legal Equality
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994).
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lesbian families from discrimination. L'Heureux-Dub6 J. on the other
hand, writing for herself and two other members of the Court on the
question of family status discrimination, wrote an impressive dissent
that incorporated insights from a wide range of feminist thinking about
the family.
It is hard to avoid a sense of djii vu when reading the Supreme
Court decision in Mossop: in the Gay Alliance case 14 years earlier,
a majority of the Supreme Court, over strong dissents, relied on some
curious arguments that allowed it to avoid directly commenting on the
issue of discrimination against gay men and lesbians. Indeed, when
one examines Gay Alliance as well as Supreme Court criminal law
decisions touching upon the rights of gay men, it appears that the Mos-
sop majority is continuing a Supreme Court tradition of failing to con-
demn, or even comment upon, heterosexism in laws and social prac-
tices.
I will begin by briefly outlining the facts and the decisions of the
Canadian Human Rights Tribunal, the Federal Court of Appeal and
the Supreme Court of Canada. I will then turn to an analysis of the
Supreme Court opinions. First, I will discuss the impact of the deci-
sions on the specific question of whether disadvantaging treatment of
gay or lesbian couples amounts to family status or sexual orientation
discrimination on the current state of the law. On this point, the dis-
sentingjudgment of L'Heureux-Dub6 J. makes a significant contribu-
tion, while the principal majority opinion of Lamer C.J. has relatively
little to say. In this sense, the Mossop decision is more of a postpone-
ment than a precedent. However, I will go on to discuss three troubling
features of the majority decisions that could cause problems for the
development of anti-discrimination law in the future.
The first problem is the reliance on an interpretive approach that
places great weight on an imputed Parliamentary intent to diminish
the scope of protection provided by anti-discrimination legislation.
This approach is at odds with previous Supreme Court jurisprudence
that has eschewed reliance on narrow constructions based on imputed
legislative intent in favour of a dynamic, generous and purposive in-
terpretation of anti-discrimination statutes.
Secondly, I will argue that the court's reliance on the absence of a
prohibition on sexual orientation discrimination as a rationale for re-
stricting the scope of family status discrimination puts to pernicious
use a recognition that grounds of discrimination frequently overlap
and interact. Incorporation of a theory of interactive discrimination is
essential if our jurisprudence is to be sophisticated enough to respond
to the diversity and complexity of people's lives and their experiences
of oppression. Lamer C.J. employed a recognition that grounds of dis-
crimination interact to diminish, rather than advance, the scope of pro-
tection available under anti-discrimination law.
Finally, I will raise some questions regarding the Court's failure to
accord any deference on judicial review to the Tribunal's interpreta-
tion of its constituent statute, the Canadian Human Rights Act. The
Court justified its interventionist posture on the grounds that the issues
in Mossop were issues of "general law" that fell within "the province
of the judiciary". This posture is understandable given the weaknesses
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in the administrative structure of the tribunal system of human rights
adjudication in Canadian anti-discrimination statutes. Nevertheless, I
will argue that the assertion of superior judicial expertise on issues
related to sexuality is simply not demonstrated by the Supreme Court's
institutional record. Indeed, the fact that the majority chose to crea-
tively avoid confronting the substantive issues presented by the Mos-
sop case is troublingly at odds with the assertion of judicial self-con-
fidence implicit in the standard of review adopted by the majority.
II. FACTS AND JUDGMENTS
The Facts
In June 1985, Brian Mossop worked as a translator for the Depart-
ment of Secretary of State. On June 3, he attended the funeral of the
father of his partner of over ten years, Ken Popert. The next day he
applied for paid bereavement leave for the day of June 3. By the terms
of a collective agreement between the Treasury Board and the Cana-
dian Union of Professional and Technical Employees, employees
could claim up to four consecutive days of paid bereavement leave
upon the death of an "immediate family member". The latter phrase
was defined as including common law spouses "of the opposite sex"
and fathers-in-law.
Mossop claimed that his partner, Popert, and the deceased, Popert
Sr., were members of his "immediate family", and thus he was entitled
to paid bereavement leave for the day he attended Popert Sr.'s funeral.
His request was denied. Mossop filed a grievance which was also
rejected on the grounds that the denial of bereavement leave was in
accordance with the terms of the collective agreement.
In August 1985, Mossop filed complaints under the Canadian Hu-
man Rights Act alleging that his employer and his union had commit-
ted a discriminatory employment practice on the prohibited ground of
family status. Sexual orientation was not a prohibited ground of dis-
crimination in the Act at the time.
THE JUDGMENTS
Canadian Human Rights Tribunal
4
In a carefully and cautiously reasoned judgment, the Tribunal mem-
ber, Ms. Elizabeth Atcheson, found that Mossop was discriminated
against on the prohibited ground of family status. She noted that family
status was not defined in the Act. A thorough review of the available
legislative history revealed that it was inconclusive on the meaning of
family status. She concluded that "family" does not have a clear mean-
ing in legal decisions or common usage. Relying on the broad and
purposive approach to the interpretation of human rights legislation
set out by the Supreme Court of Canada, she reasoned as follows:
The possibilities inherent in the term family are many, and complex ... In the
Tribunal's view, the test of "general understanding" must be rejected, quite
4 Mossop v. Treasury Board of Canada (1989), 10C.H.R.R. D/6064.
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apart from its majoritarian aspects, because it cannot be ascertained with any
degree of confidence ... the Act does not promote certain types of status over
others and ... the Act is intended to address group stereotypes. For these
reasons, the Tribunal finds that it is reasonable to conclude that homosexual
couples may constitute a family.
5
Ms. Atcheson went on to state that "[b]ereavement leave appears
to be designed to meet the particular needs of family members at a
difficult time". 6 She noted that in advancing this purpose the functional
characteristics of relationships were more relevant than their "formal
status". 7 She found that the collective agreement discriminated on the
basis of family status by excluding from bereavement leave "a perma-
nent and public relationship with a person of the same sex". 8 In the
result, she ordered that the day of leave taken by Mossop be designated
a day of paid bereavement leave.
Federal Court of Appeal9
The Attorney-General of Canada brought an application for judicial
review of the Tribunal's decision under s.28 of the Federal Court Act.
The Tribunal decision was reversed by the Federal Court of Appeal.
Marceau J.A., who wrote the principal judgment for a unanimous bench,
rejected the submission of the Canadian Human Rights Commission
that the court should interfere with the Tribunal's interpretation of the
meaning of "family status" only if it was patently unreasonable. In the
absence of a privative clause, Marceau J.A. held that the standard of
review on questions of law should be a correctness test. 10
In Marceau J.'s view, the tribunal's interpretation was not the le-
gally correct one. He rejected the "functional" approach to the defini-
tion of family adopted by the Tribunal in favour of a "legal" approach.
He argued that the "basic concept" of family is a group of individuals
related by blood, marriage or adoption." Marceau J. went on to argue
that the "real issue underlying the complaint" was sexual orientation
rather than family status.'
2
Stone J. wrote a short concurring judgment in which he agreed with
Marceau J.'s approach and placed special emphasis on the fact that
Parliament had added family status, but not sexual orientation, as a
prohibited ground of discrimination to the Act in 1983.13 Thus, Stone
J.A., like Marceau J.A., appeared to believe that the "real" ground of
discrimination at issue was "sexual orientation".
14
5 Id. at D/6092 and D/6094.
6 Id. at D/6096.
7 Id. at D/6096.
8 Id. at D/6097.
9 [19911 I F.C. 18 (C.A.).
10 Id. at 31-2.
11 Id. at 34-5.
12 Id. at 37.
13 Id. at41.
14 For an insightful analysis and comparison of the Tribunal and Federal Court of
Appeal decisions, see D. Herman, "'Sociologically Speaking"', supra note 3. See
also, Freeman, supra note 3, for an excellent critique of the Federal Court of
Appeal decision.
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Supreme Court of Canada
An appeal of the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Mossop to the
Supreme Court of Canada was dismissed.' 5 A 6-1 majority of the
Court agreed with Marceau J.A.'s holding that a tribunal's legal find-
ings should be upheld on judicial review only if the reviewing judges
agree with those findings. 16 A narrow 4-3 majority did not agree with
the Tribunal's finding that a gay couple could have a family status
under the Act.' 7 Like Stone J.A. at the Federal Court of Appeal, Lamer
C.J. found that Parliament's failure to add sexual orientation as a pro-
hibited ground of discrimination was "determinative".' 8 He also
agreed with Marceau J.A.'s assertion that sexual orientation was "re-
ally the ground of discrimination involved".' 9 Family status could not
include a gay couple, because "Parliament's clear intent ... was to not
extend to anyone protection from discrimination based on sexual ori-
entation. '20 La Forest J. also believed that Parliamentary intent was
determinative. As he concluded, "neither ordinary meaning, context
or purpose indicates a legislative intention to include same-sex cou-
ples within 'family status'.
' '21
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT JUDG-
MENTS IN MOSSOP FOR GAY AND LESBIAN COU-
PLES LITIGATING EQUALITY RIGHTS
1. The Implications of the Majority Judgments for the Interpre-
tation of Family Status Discrimination
(a) Family Status and the CHRA
Lamer C.J.'s majority judgment amounts to a simple deferral of the
question of whether a gay or lesbian couple can have family status for
the purpose of bringing a claim of discrimination on that ground under
15 Supra note 1.
16 La Forest J. (lacobucci J. concurring) wrote the principal majority judgment
adopting the "correctness test" as the appropriate standard of judicial review of
the legal findings of human rights tribunals. Lamer C.J. (Iacobucci and Sopinka
JJ. concurring) agreed with La Forest J.'s approach (at 578). In short concurring
judgments, both Cory J. (at 648) and McLachlin J. (at 648-9) also agreed with La
Forest J. on this issue. L'Heureux-Dub6 J. was the lone dissenting voice on the
standard of review. She would have deferred to the Tribunal's interpretation of
the Act unless that interpretation was "patently unreasonable" (at 647).
17 The majority judgments were written by Lamer C.J. (lacobucci and Sopinka JJ.
concurring) and La Forest J. (lacobucci J. concurring). La Forest J. noted that he
shared "the general approach of the Chief Justice and would dispose of the case
as he proposes" (at 583). L'lHeureux-Dub J., dissenting, found that the Tribunal
decision was not "at all unreasonable" (at 636). In their short dissenting
judgments, Cory J. (at 648) and McLachlin J. (at 648-9) found that the Tribunal
decision was correct for the reasons reviewed by L'Heureux-Dub6 J..
18 Supra note I at 580.
19 Id. at581.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 587.
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the current state of the CHRA. This is because his reasoning is based
on a state of the CHRA that appears to no longer exist.
Lamer C.J.'s denial of family status to the relationship between
Mossop and the Poperts is based solely on the absence of sexual ori-
entation as a prohibited ground of discrimination in the Act at the time
that the complaint was brought in 1985. The 1992 decision of the
Ontario Court of Appeal in Haig22 found that the equality rights in the
Charter required that sexual orientation be added as a prohibited
ground of discrimination under the Act. In the result, the Ontario Court
of Appeal issued an order that the Act "be interpreted, applied and
administered as though it contained "sexual orientation" as a prohib-
ited ground of discrimination". 23 The Minister of Justice decided not
to seek leave to appeal the Haig decision to the Supreme Court of
Canada. Thus, the Haig ruling stands, and the Canadian Human Rights
Commission, tribunals and lower courts must interpret the CHRA "as
though it contained 'sexual orientation' as a prohibited ground of dis-
crimination."
Lamer C.J. made it clear that he was not passing judgment on the
question of whether the facts of this case would amount to family
status discrimination if the complaint had been brought at a time when
sexual orientation was also a prohibited ground of discrimination un-
der the Act (as it now appears to be). Since Parliament had not passed
an amendment adding sexual orientation to the Act, and since the
Charter had not been argued in this case to accomplish the same result,
Lamer C.J. stated that he was unable to conclude that "Mr. Mossop's
situation included both his sexual orientation and his 'family
status'". 2
4
It is possible that in some future case the Supreme Court of Canada
may disagree with the Haig ruling, and find that the Constitution does
not require that sexual orientation be read into the CHRA. 25 If so, and
22 Haig v. Canada (Minister of Justice) (1992), 94 D.L.R. (4th) 1.
23 Id. at 14-15.
24 Id.
25 In his judgment in Mossop, Lamer C.J. did not indicate whether he agreed with
the result in Haig. The Mossop appeal was argued on June 3, 1992. On July 9,
1992, the Supreme Court released its decision in Schachter v. Canada, [1992] 2
S.C.R. 679, holding that the courts could add language to statutes to correct
constitutional deficiencies in certain circumstances. The Ontario Court of Appeal
released its judgment in Haig, adopting the "reading in" remedy, on August 6,
1992. On October 28, 1992, as it became increasingly apparent the federal
government would not seek leave to appeal the Haig ruling the Supreme Court
invited the parties to the Mossop litigation to make further submissions in light
of Haig. The Human Rights Commission and the intervenors supporting Mossop
chose not to challenge the constitutionality of s.3 of the CHRA. Lamer C.J.
indicated that he would have preferred to address the constitutionality of the
exclusion of sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination. In his
words, "[ilt would then have been possible to give a much more complete and
lasting solution to the present problem", supra note I at 579. He went on to note
that if such a challenge had been made and the legislation was found to violate
the Charter, "then the courts are commanded under s.52 of the Constitution Act,
1982 to declare the section inoperative or to amend it when permissible along the
lines set out in Schachter as did the Ontario Court of Appeal in Haig", id. at 582.
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the new federal government, like the last one, proves unable to follow
through on its promise to pass amending legislation adding sexual
orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination to the Act, then
Lamer C.J.'s reasoning would continue to prevent gay or lesbian cou-
ples from-using the CHRA to challenge laws or policies that exclude
their relationships. The combination of these two events is a fairly
unlikely scenario, but nothing can be taken for granted given the dis-
mal record of both Parliament and the Supreme Court on gay and
lesbian rights issues.
(b) Family Status and the Anti-Discrimination Statutes of Other
Jurisdictions
Lamer C.J.'s judgment will also have very little practical impact on
the interpretation of family status as a ground of discrimination in
human rights legislation in other jurisdictions across the country. In
addition to the CHRA, family status is currently a prohibited ground
of discrimination in the human rights legislation of six provinces and
the two territories. 26 Three provinces - Nova Scotia, Ontario and
Saskatchewan - define family status narrowly, as the status of being
in a parent/child relationship (the other six jurisdictions do not define
family status).27 In the nine jurisdictions that currently prohibit family
status discrimination, only the Northwest Territories does not also pro-
hibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.28 Thus, the
Northwest Territories is currently the only jurisdiction in the country
in which Lamer C.J.'s judgment in Mossop could conceivably be re-
Whether the exclusion of sexual orientation from the grounds of discrimination
covered by s.3 of the Act violated the Charter, and if so, whether it would then
be a constitutionally "permissible" remedy to "read in" sexual orientation, are
matters on which Lamer C.J. expressed no opinion. Why the Court should ever
feel free to ignore the dictates of the Charter, or the supremacy of constitutional
law more generally, is not made clear in his judgment.
26 They are: British Columbia, Manitoba, Nova Scotia, the Northwest Territories,
Ontario, Quebec, Saskatchewan and The Yukon. Canadian Human Rights Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c.H-6, s.3( 1); HumanRightsAct, S.B.C. 1984, c.22 (as am. by S.B.C.
1992, c.43) s.2(1), s.3(1), s.5(l), s.6, s.8(l), s.9; Human Rights Code, R.S.O.
1990, c.H. 19, s. 1, s.2, s.3, s.5, s.6; Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, S.S. 1979,
c.S-24.1 (as am. by S.S. 1993, c.61) s.9, s.10(l), s. I1(1), s. 12(1), s.13(1), s. 14(l),
s.15(l), s.16; Human Rights Code, S.M. 1987-88, c.45 (C.C.S.M., c.H175),
s.9(2)(i); Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q. 1977, c.C-12, s.10
("civil status" or "l'6tat civil"); Human Rights Act, R.S.N.S. 1979, c.214 (as am.
by S.N.S. 1991, c.12), s.5(1)(r); Fair Practices Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c.F-2,
ss.3-5 (uses "family" rather than "family status"); Human Rights Act, S.Y. 1987,
c.3 (R.S.Y. 1986 Supp., c.l 1), s.6(k).
27 Nova Scotia, s.3(h); Ontario, s.10(l); Saskatchewan, s.2(l)(h.1).
28 Of course, if the Haig ruling is followed by the courts in the Northwest Territories,
sexual orientation will be added whether or not amending legislation is passed.
This could also occur in Alberta, Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island, the
remaining three provinces where sexual orientation is not a prohibited ground of
discrimination. See the Individual's Rights Protection Act, R.S.A. 1980, c.1-2;
Human Rights Code, R.S.N. 1990, c.H-14; Human Rights Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988,
c.H-12. A recent ruling of the Alberta Queen's Bench has followed Haig: see
Vriend v. Alberta, [1994] AJ. No. 272, Russell J., April 12, 1994.
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lied upon to argue that the legislature did not intend gay or lesbian
relationships to be included in the term family status. Even then,
Lamer C.J. warned against interpreting his ruling "as meaning that
homosexual couples cannot constitute a "family" for the purposes of
legislation other than the CHRA.
' 29
Thus, Lamer C.J.'s decision for the majority of the court appears to
have been carefully crafted to avoid establishing a precedent one way
or the other on the central question presented to it: namely, whether a
gay couple has a family status for the purposes of bringing a complaint
on that ground under anti-discrimination statutes.
2. The Implications of the Majority Judgments on the Interpre-
tation of Sexual Orientation Discrimination
Sexual orientation is now a prohibited ground of discrimination in
the CHRA30 and in the human rights legislation of seven provinces and
the Yukon. 3' Moreover, there is a clear judicial consensus that sexual
orientation is an analogous ground of discrimination for the purposes
of s. 15 of the Charter.32 The inclusion of sexual orientation as a pro-
hibited ground of discrimination in human rights legislation and s.15
of the Charter means that sexual orientation is presumptively unre-
lated to a person's merits and capacities. This means that individuals
cannot be denied opportunities, benefits or rights solely because they
are, or are perceived to be, lesbian, gay, bisexual or transsexual. This
much is relatively uncontroversial in legal theory. However, consen-
sus is replaced with confusion in the case law when it comes to deter-
mining the implications of prohibitions on sexual orientation discrimi-
nation on the legal treatment of gay and lesbian relationships.
To date, the case law on whether prohibitions on sexual orientation
29 Supra note t at 582.
30 As a result of the Haig decision, supra note 22.
31 The seven provinces are British Columbia, Manitoba, Nova Scotia, New
Brunswick, Ontario, Quebec and Saskatchewan. See Human Rights Act, S.B.C.
1984, c.22 (as am. by S.B.C. 1992, c.43) s.2(l), s.3(l), s.4, s.5(l), s.6, s.8(l), s.9;
Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c.H.19, s.1, s.2, s.3, s.5, s.6; Saskatchewan
Human Rights Code, S.S. 1979, c.S-24.1 (as am. by S.S. 1993, c.61) s.9, s. 10(1),
s.l 1(1), s.12(l), s.13(1), s.14(l), s.15(l), s.16; Human Rights Code, S.M. 1987-
88, c.45 (C.C.S.M., c.H 175), s.9(2)(h); Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms,
R.S.Q. 1977, c.C-12, s.10 ; Human Rights Act, R.S.N.S. 1979, c.214 (as am. by
S.N.S. 1991, c. 12), s.5(1)(n); Human Rights Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c.H- 11 (as am.
by S.N.B. 1992, c.30), ss.3-7; Human Rights Act, S.Y. 1987, c.3 (R.S.Y. 1986,
c.! 1), s.6.
32 Brown v. B.C. (Minister of Health) (1990), 66 D.L.R. (4th) 444 (B.C.S.C.);
Douglas v. Canada, [1993) 1 F.C. 264 (1993), 58 F.T.R. 147 (F.C.T.D.); Egan
v. Canada (1993), 103 D.L.R. (4th) 336 (F.C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C.
granted, October 14, 1993; Haig, supra note 22; Knodel v. British Columbia
(Medical Services Commission) (1991), 58 B.C.L.R. (2d) 356 (S.C.); Laylandv.
Ontario (1993), 104 D.L.R. (4th) 214 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.), leave to appeal to
Ontario Court of Appeal granted; Leshner v. Ontario (No.2) (1992), 16 C.H.R.R.
D/184 (Ont. Bd. Inq.); Veysey v. Correctional Service of Canada, (1989), 29
F.T.R. 74, [19901 1 F.C. 321, affd on other grounds (1990), 109 N.R. 300
(F.C.A.), Vriend, supra note 28.
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discrimination require the recognition of same-sex partners as
"spouses" or "family" is divided.33 Some courts and tribunals have
held that laws or policies that impose disadvantages on same-sex cou-
ples relative to their heterosexual counterparts discriminate on the ba-
sis of sexual orientation. The decision-makers in Veysey,
34 Knodel,35
Leshner36 and Clinton37 have accepted that one's choice of an intimate
living partner is closely linked to one's sexual orientation. Indeed, this
point would be too obvious to be worth mentioning had it not been
denied in a host of other decisions. Persons who consider themselves
heterosexual do not generally choose to live with persons of the same
sex in an intimate relationship. Similarly, persons who consider them-
selves lesbian or gay do not generally prefer to live with persons of
the opposite sex in an intimate relationship, although this is not un-
common given the strong legal and social pressures to appear to con-
form to a heterosexual norm. It is hard to imagine that persons in
different-sex relationships would not consider themselves the victims
of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation if, say, employment
benefit plans included only same-sex partners. The point is that dis-
advantaging treatment of same-sex relationships is obviously also
treatment that has a disparate and disadvantaging impact on persons
who are lesbian and gay.
However, another group of decisions denies this elementary propo-
sition. Some courts and tribunals have held that disadvantaging treat-
ment of gay and lesbian couples does not amount to discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation. 38 Instead, it has been argued that gay
men and lesbians are not disadvantaged by such laws and policies
because they are always free to enter a heterosexual relationship if
they are truly determined to obtain the advantages that such laws or
policies confer.39 Or, it has been argued that disadvantaging treatment
imposed on gay and lesbian couples is not based on their sexual ori-
entation per se, but rather on the fact that homosexuality is non-pro-
33 For detailed discussion of these cases, see the works cited in supra note 3. See
also Ryder, "Becoming Spouses: The Rights of Lesbian and Gay Couples" (1994)
Law Society of Upper Canada Special Lectures 1993 (forthcoming).
34 Veysey, supra note 32 (exclusion of inmate's gay partner from family visiting
program at federal penitentiary violates s. 15 of the Charter).
35 Knodel, supra note 32 (exclusion of gay partners from definition of spouse in
health regulations violates s. 15 of the Charter).
36 Leshner, supra note 32 (denial of spousal pension rights to employee's gay partner
constitutes discrimination on the basis of marital status and sexual orientation).
37 Clinton v. Ontario Blue Cross (No. 2) (1993), 18 C.H.R.R. D/377 (Ont. Bd. Inq.)
(denial of spousal health benefits to employee's lesbian partner constitutes
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation).
38 (Karen) Andrews v. Ontario (Minister of Health) (1988), 64 O.R. (2d) 258
(Ont.H.Ct.) (exclusion of lesbian partner from definition of spouse in health
regulations does not violate s.15 of the Charter); Vogel v. Manitoba (No. 1)
(1983), 4 C.H.R.R. D/1654 (Man. Bd. Adj.) and Vogel v. Manitoba (No. 2)
(1992), 90 D.L.R. (4th) 84 (Man. Q.B.) (exclusion of gay partner from spousal
employment benefits is not discriminatory); Egan, supra note 32; Layland, supra
note 32 (common law rule barring same-sex marriage does not violate s. 15 of the
Charter).
39 Layland, supra note 32 at 223.
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creative.40 Or, in an equally specious example of rigorous illogic, it
has been argued that any disadvantage suffered by same-sex couples
results from the fact that they are not spouses under the law; a result
which, we are asked to believe, has nothing to do with their sexual
orientation .4
Clearly, the life of the law in this area has very little to do with logic,
and much to do with charged political struggles surrounding the mean-
ing and value of homosexuality. For some, sexuality is a terrain of
oppression, and anti-heterosexist struggle an important element of the
fight for ajust and equal society. Or, in a more liberal version, sexuality
is a matter of morally neutral private choices. Thus, subject only to
concerns regarding age, consent and consanguinity, not only must the
criminal law be removed from the bedrooms of the nation, but also
any other laws or policies that attach penalties or incentives to the
manner in which citizens exercise sexual self-determination. For oth-
ers, homosexuality is immoral if not dangerous, or at least, in the more
tempered statements of conservative jurists, "controversial". 42 Adher-
ents of these competing perspectives may more easily agree on pro-
viding protection to individual gay men and lesbians from being de-
prived of their rights to services, homes or jobs solely because of their
sexual orientation. Such protection can be squared, grudgingly, with
a conservative morality that under pressure from gay and lesbian re-
sistance will yield some compassion for "the sinner" so long as "the
sin" remains condemned. However, achieving agreement on human
rights protections for gay and lesbian relationships is more difficult
precisely because it entails a measure of acceptance and recognition
of relationships founded in part on acts of same-sex eroticism.
Unlike his colleague L'Heureux-Dub6 J., Lamer C.J. preferred to
postpone engaging in these highly contested political/legal debates to
another day. However, the legal escape route he chose does at least
provide support to the view that disadvantaging treatment of gay and
lesbian couples constitutes discrimination on the basis of sexual ori-
entation. Lamer C.J. argued that:
Mr. Mossop's sexual orientation is so closely connected with the grounds
which led to the refusal of the benefit that this denial could not be condemned
as discrimination on the basis of "family status" without indirectly introducing
into the CHRA the prohibition which Parliament specifically decided not to
40 Id. at 222-3;Andrews, supra note 38 at 263.
41 Andrews, supra note 38 at 263; Vogel (No. 2), supra note 38 at 101.
42 See, e.g., Martland J.'s reference in the Gay Alliance case, supra note 2, to the
"controversial subject of homosexuality" (at 455-6) and his incredulous tone in
reciting the "thesis" of the Gay Tide newspaper that "homosexuality is a valid
and legitimate form of human sexual and emotional expression in no way harmful
to society or the individual and completely on a par with heterosexuality" (at 450).
See also Nielsen v. Canada, [ 1992] 2 F.C. 561 (T.D.), where Muldoon J. reacted
with similar incredulity to the "polemical" nature of the argument in the plaintiff's
factum regarding the relationship of heterosexuality to gender inequality (at 573),
and commented that "[iut is a well-known fact, of which the Court takes notice,
that Canadian society is deeply riven over the question of homosexual
behaviour...." (at 577).
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include in the Act, namely the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation.
43
Lamer C.J. went on to quote with approval Marceau J.A.'s view that
"sexual orientation is really the ground of discrimination involved" in
the case.44 Implicit in this analysis is the view that sexual orientation
discrimination encompasses discrimination against lesbian and gay
relationships. Indeed, Lamer C.J. went on to reject the argument that
the status of being in a same-sex relationship could somehow be
severed from the issue of sexual orientation.
45
Thus, while Brian Mossop's complaint ultimately failed, Lamer
C.J.'s decision does offer real hope of success to gay and lesbian liti-
gants in future challenges to laws or policies that exclude their rela-
tionships, if those challenges are brought under the Charter or anti-
discrimination laws in which sexual orientation is a prohibited ground
of discrimination.
46
3. L'Heureux-DubW J.'s Contribution to the Interpretation of
Family Status Discrimination
L'Heureux-Dub6 J.'s dissent ought to be more influential than the
typical dissent, since it represents the views of the only three members
43 Supra note 1 at 580. In his short concurring opinion, La Forest J. also relied on
the absence of legislative history indicating that "Parliament intended to cover
the situation of a same-sex couple." Id. at 586. He believed that, in the absence
of such a legislative intent, the question of requiring the extension of bereavement
leave (and presumably other employment benefits) on equal terms to same-sex
couples was "an issue for Parliament to address." Id.
44 Id. at 581.
45 Id. at 581.
46 A recent ruling of the Public Service Staff Relations Board supports this view of
the state of federal anti-discrimination law after Haig and Mossop. An adjudicator
ruled that the federal government's refusal to provide family leave and be-
reavement leave to a gay employee, David Lorenzen, constituted discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation prohibited by the Canadian Human Rights Act
and the anti-discrimination clause in the federal government's collective
agreement with the Public Service Alliance of Canada. See M. Philp, "Ottawa
ordered to grant same-sex family leaves" Globe and Mail (2 October 1993) A3;
"Ruling backs homosexual couples" Toronto Star (2 October 1993) A16. The
new federal government has decided to abandon an application for judicial review
of this ruling. Se M. Philp, "Ottawa Acquiesces on Gay Spousal Leave", Globe
& Mail (15 April 1994) A . Similarly, in Canadian Post Corporation v. P.S.A.C.
(March 8, 1994), arbitrator Stephen Kelleher ruled that the denial of spousal
medical benefits to the gay partner of a postal worker constituted prohibited
discrimination.
The Supreme Court's first opportunity to address the rights of lesbian and gay
couples under the Charter will be on the appeal of the Egan ruling, supra note
32. In the meantime, the Court's disposition of another Charter challenge to a
legislative definition of spouse will no doubt be revealing: see Miron v. Trudel
(1991), 83 D.L.R. (4th) 766 (Ont. C.A.) (exclusion of unmarried heterosexual
couples from spousal insurance benefits does not violate s. 15 of the Charter),
leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada granted, June 4, 1992.
Family Status
of the Court to turn their minds to the issue of gay family status in a
manner that is relevant under the present state of the CHRA.
Her judgment is animated by a pluralistic and egalitarian conception
of families. She rejected in strong language the argument that the
"dominant" or "traditional" conception of family exhausts the mean-
ing of the term.47 She discussed the social reality of Canadian familial
diversity, and noted that the way many people in Canada currently
experience family does not necessarily fit with the dominant model of
a man and a woman and their children. 48 She recognized that family
structures have proven to be fluid and dynamic over time, that "there
is no consensus as to the boundaries of family" and the meaning of
family may vary depending upon the context or purpose for which the
definition is desired.49 She illustrated these points by drawing on the
insights of a wide range of feminist and lesbian theory. All of these
features of her judgment are consistent with the work of other Cana-
dian scholars who have argued for the need to develop an "anti-essen-
tialist" understanding of family.
50
L'Heureux-Dub6 J. supported the functional approach to the defi-
nition of family adopted by the Tribunal. On her characterization of
this approach, one measures a relationship against a "cluster of vari-
ables that may be commonly found in families"5' to determine whether
that relationship possesses enough of those same variables, or per-
forms enough of the same functions, to qualify as familial. The diffi-
culty with this approach is that it appears to accord familial recognition
to relationships to the degree that they conform to accepted or domi-
nant family forms.5 2 A functional approach conceptualized in this way
compromises to some extent L'Heureux-Dub6 J.'s commitment to an
egalitarian and pluralistic conception of the family. While not unmind-
ful of these difficulties,53 she did not feel the need to resolve them
47 Supra note 1 at 624.
48 Id. at 628.
49 Supra note I at 626.
50 See the work of Cossman, Freeman and Duclos (lyer) cited in supra note 3.
51 Supra note I at 637.
52 The assimilationist tendencies of the functional approach are discussed by
Freeman, supra note 3 at 63-74. My own view is that a functional approach is
unavoidable, but that the functions or attributes necessary to family status must
not be defined by reference to dominant conceptions of family but rather by
reference to the purposes of the law or poficy in question. For example, since the
purpose of bereavement leave is to respect the need to mourn the loss of loved
ones, the presence of a strong emotional tie to the deceased (or a person mourning
the loss of the deceased) is the only attribute of a relationship that is relevant.
Since the possibility of inquiries into the validity of an employee's emotions is a
grotesque one, it follows that the only solution that respects an equality and
diversity of intimate relationships is one that allows employees themselves to
determine which of their relationships should count for the purposes of
bereavement leave. The possibility of abuse could be limited by capping each
employee's entitlement, as proposed in the factum of EGALE et al, paras. 57-9.
53 L'Heureux-Dubd J. acknowledged the potentially assimilationist tendencies and
invasive aspects of a functional approach to defining family. See her discussion,
supra note I at 637-8.
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because it was enough that the functional approach chosen by the Tri-
bunal was a reasonable one.
A laudable feature of L'Heureux-Dub6 J.'s judgment is the care she
took to counter some of the illogic, myths, and stereotypes that have
plagued lower court decisions dealing with the equality rights of gay
and lesbian couples. Thus, for example, she rejected the myths that
only heterosexual people can be good parents or have loving and car-
ing relationships.54 She also clearly rejected the argument that the ca-
pacity for procreation is a necessary element of a family relationship. 5
And she enlisted "true family values" in support of her position.
56
IV. PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS LEGISLATION
We have seen that the majority judgment of Lamer C.J. does not
establish a precedent that is likely to hamper the struggle of gay men
and lesbians for legal recognition of their relationships, and indeed has
helped advance that struggle in recent cases.5 7 Let us now turn to an
analysis of the approach taken by the majority judges to the interpre-
tation of anti-discrimination legislation. Here I will seek to demon-
strate that the heavy reliance placed on a presumed legislative intent
by Lamer C.J. in the principal majority judgment, and by La Forest J.
in his short concurrence, is an approach that departs from the general
principles that the Court has developed to guide the interpretation of
human rights legislation. If followed in future cases, this approach
could seriously limit what has hitherto been a significant positive con-
tribution by tribunals and courts to the development of anti-discrimi-
nation law. While it is too early to say with any certainty, the early
evidence suggests that the Mossop case is an aberration, likely ex-
plained more by the Court's lack of understanding of sexuality as a
human rights issue than a retrenchment from its support of anti-dis-
crimination law generally.
Before examining the majority judgments in Mossop on this point,
a brief overview of the interpretive principles the Court has brought
to bear on anti-discrimination legislation is warranted.
1. The Quasi-Constitutional Nature of Anti-Discrimination
Legislation
In a series of judgments over the past decade, the Supreme Court
has fashioned a distinct theory of interpretation for anti-discrimination
statutes. This theory can be summed up in the Court's characterization
of anti-discrimination legislation as "quasi-constitutional" in nature.
Lamer J. launched this development in his 1982 judgment in Heer-
spink, in which he commented that anti-discrimination laws are "fun-
damental", considered by the people to be, "save their constitutional
54 Id. at 632 and 630.
55 Id. at 634.
56 Id.
57 Supra note 46.
1993
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laws, more important than all others."58 Since then, the Court has vari-
ously described anti-discrimination statutes as "public and fundamen-
tal law of general application", 59 as declaring "public policy regarding
matters of general concern", 6° as being "of a special nature, not quite
constitutional but certainly more than ordinary", 6' as incorporating
"certain basic goals of our society", 62 as "intended to give rise,
amongst other things, to individual rights of vital importance", 63 and
as "often the final refuge of the disadvantaged and disenfranchised.
64
The Court has attached a number of interpretive consequences to
the quasi-constitutional status of anti-discrimination laws. One is the
primacy of such laws over other legislation, even in the absence of an
explicit clause to that effect. In the case of inconsistency with other
validly enacted legislation, human rights laws will prevail, unless the
legislature says otherwise "in express and unequivocal language.
65
Another is that parties cannot contract out of the requirements of hu-
man rights legislation. 66 And, most importantly for our purposes, the
Court has repeatedly emphasized that narrow and literal interpreta-
tions are to be eschewed in favour of large, liberal and purposive in-
terpretations that best advance the broad policy against discrimina-
tion. 67 This approach accounts for the Court's recognition that the
concept of discrimination must encompass unintentional forms of dis-
crimination, including "systemic" and "adverse effect" discrimina-
tion, if the goals of the legislation are to be achieved. 68 The prohibited
grounds of discrimination are also defined by reference to this broad
and purposive approach.69 Another corollary of the liberal and pur-
posive approach to interpretation is that exceptions to prohibitions
against discrimination are to be interpreted narrowly. 70 More gener-
58 LC.B.C. v. Heerspink, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 145 at 158.
59 Winnipeg School Division No. I v. Craton, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 150, per McIntyre J.
at 156 (quoting and agreeing with a statement of Monnin CJ.M. at the Manitoba
Court of Appeal).
60 Id.
61 O.H.R.C. v. Simpsons Sears, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536 at 547.
62 Robichaud v. Canada, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 84 at 90.
63 C.N. v. Canada (Action Travail des Femmes), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114 at 1134.
64 Zurich Insurance Co. v. Ontario, [1992 2 S.C.R. 321 at 339.
65 Heerspink, supra note 58 at 158. See also Craton, supra note 59 at 156.
66 Heerspink, supra note 58 at 158; OHRC v. Etobicoke, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 202;
Craton, supra note 59; Dickason v. University ofAlberta, [ 1992] 2 S.C.R. 1103.
67 Simpsons Sears, supra note 61 at 547; Bhinder v. C.N., [19851 2 S.C.R. 561 at
568;Action Travail des Femmes, supra note 63 at 1133-4; Robichaud, supra note
62 at 89-90; Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219 at 1245;
Dickason, supra note 66; U.B.C. v. Berg, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 353 at 370-1. For an
overview, see D'Silva, "Giving Effect to Human Rights Legislation - A
Purposive Approach" (1991) 3 Windsor Rev. Legal & Soc. Issues 45.
68 Simpsons Sears, supra note 61; Action Travail des Femmes, supra note 63. As
Dickson C.J. commented in the latter case, the rejection of the necessity to prove
an intent to discriminate, and the adoption of the concept of adverse effect
discrimination, "is the result of a commitment to the purposive interpretation of
human rights legislation" (at 1137).
69 See Brooks, supra note 67; Janzen v. Platy Enterprises, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1252.
70 Bhinder, supra note 67 at 569; Zurich, supra note 64 at 339.
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ally, the Court has said that protection against discrimination cannot
be diminished by the legislature absent "clear legislative pronounce-
ment".71
2. The Mossop Majority: Introducing Legislative Intent
Lamer C.J.'s judgment in Mossop made no reference to the large,
liberal and purposive approach that the Court has adopted in interpret-
ing human rights legislation, nor did he explain how his interpretation
squared with that approach. He apparently believed that the clarity of
Parliament's intent to exclude gay families from family status ren-
dered such a discussion unnecessary. La Forest J. agreed, and added
that neither the "ordinary meaning" of family status, nor evidence of
Parliament's intent in adding family status as a prohibited ground of
discrimination in 1983, suggested that the term ought to include a
"relationship dependent on a same-sex living arrangement. '72
La Forest J. did acknowledge that "the statute should be interpreted
generously with a view to effect its purpose". 73 However, rather than
look at the "broad" or "dominant" purposes of the legislation as has
been the Court's practice, 74 La Forest J. narrowed the inquiry to Par-
liament's purpose (or intent) in amending the CHRA to add family
status as a prohibited ground of discrimination in 1983. The use of the
same word "purpose" to describe these two types of reasoning should
not obscure the fundamental difference in approach. La Forest J. did
not seek to define the vague language of the statute by reference to the
need to advance its overall or dominant purpose of promoting equality
71 Craton, supra note 59 at 156. See also Bhinder, supra note 67 at 571 (reduction
of protection of the individual from discrimination "would require clear and
explicit words to that effect."). These statements have to be updated to reflect
developments in the jurisprudence since the equality rights of the Charter came
into force. It now appears that, once passed, much of the content of anti-
discrimination statutes is constitutionally mandated rather than a discretionary
exercise of legislative power. In cases like Re Blainey (1986), 54 O.R. (2d) 513
(C.A.), Haig, supra note 22, Leshner, supra note 32, and McKinney v. University
of Guelph, [ 1990] 3 S.C.R. 229, courts and tribunals have suggested that the scope
of protection against public and private discrimination afforded by human rights
legislation must be at least co-extensive with that provided against discriminatory
government action by s.15 of the Charter. If human rights legislation that does
not go "far enough" in protecting against discrimination violates equality rights,
then it would seem to follow that any attempt to amend or repeal human rights
legislation so as to provide less protection than that afforded by s.15 against
government action would be similarly unconstitutional. Cf. Reitman v. Mulkey
(1967), 387 U.S. 369 (state attempt to repeal anti-discrimination statute violates
the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution). In such circumstances, the
"clear and explicit" statutory language referred to in Craton would not be
constitutionally capable of accomplishing a limiting legislative intent unless the
legislature also had resort to the notwithstanding clause in s.33 of the Charter.
72 Supra note I at 586.
73 Id.
74 For example, Simpsons Sears, supra note 61 at 547; Bhinder, supra note 67 at
568; Action Travail des Feinmes, supra note 63 at 1133; Robichaud, supra note
62 at 89; Berg, supra note 67 at 370.
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by overcoming the most socially destructive and prevalent forms of
discrimination.
On a purposive approach to family status discrimination, one would
ask what kinds of domestic living arrangements have given rise to so-
cial, economic or legal penalties unrelated to the quality of the rela-
tionships involved. Those are precisely the kinds of relationships that
ought to be protected by the inclusion of "family status" in human
rights legislation. Persons in socially-stigmatized family relationships
are likely to be denied the dignity and equal respect that it is the overall
purpose of human rights legislation to foster. In short, the meaning of
personal characteristics that are prohibited grounds of discrimination
should be defined in a manner that identifies and seeks to overcome
patterns of group-based disadvantage associated with those charac-
teristics.
75
On a purposive approach, the problem with a reliance on the "ordi-
nary meaning" of family status should be apparent: it is likely to limit
protection to the dominant or most privileged family forms. Rather
than placing the overcoming of disadvantage associated with family
status at the heart of anti-discrimination law, it risks leaving out dis-
advantaged family forms altogether. The Tribunal decision in Mossop
was attuned to these concerns in its rejection of the "majoritarian as-
pects" of a test of "general understanding" in favour of an interpreta-
tion more consistent with the fact that "the Act is intended to address
group stereotypes."
76
In place of an interpretation consonant with the dominant purpose
of anti-discrimination law, the majority judgments place great reliance
on a presumed intent of Parliament to exclude gay couples from family
status. The intent thus relied on can only be a presumed or attributed
intent: no reliable evidence of Parliament's intention exists. Parlia-
ment chose not to define family status when it was added as a prohib-
ited ground of discrimination in 1983. Family status was then, and still
is, a relatively new addition to anti-discrimination law that lacks a
settled jurisprudential meaning in that context. There was not, and still
is not, a body of jurisprudence dealing with the question of whether
gay families have family status.77 Moreover, the available legislative
history is inconclusive. If anything, it suggests that Parliament's intent
was to have tribunals and courts determine the precise meaning of
family status in the usual evolutionary, case-by-case basis. The Min-
ister of Justice, when pressed to explain why the government had cho-
sen not to define family status in the Bill, explained that it was the
government's preference to have the courts and the Human Rights
Commission perform that interpretive task, as is the case with other
undefined grounds of discrimination. 78 The evidence simply does not
75 These principles of discrimination law are expressed most clearly in the Court's
leading decisions under s.15 of the Charter: Andrews v. Law Society of B.C.,
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 and R. v. Turpin, [ 1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296.
76 Supra note 4 at D/6092 and D/6094.
77 The only decisions on point are from Manitoba: see Vogel #1 and Vogel #2, supra
note 38.
78 See the discussion of this evidence by the Tribunal, supra note 4 at D/6081-4, and
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support the majority judges' contention that the responsibility for the
interpretation they adopted was Parliament's rather than their own. In
these circumstances, deferring to a presumed Parliamentary intent to
exclude gay couples from protection seems to be a disingenuous rati-
fication of majoritarian understandings and an abdication of the
Court's commitment to a generous and dynamic interpretation of anti-
discrimination statutes.
3. Dwelling on the "Quasi" Side of Quasi-Constitutional: The
Relevance of Legislative Intent
Apart from the difficulties of knowing whether the majority read
Parliament's mind accurately, it is striking that neither Lamer C.J. nor
La Forest J. found it necessary to discuss the legitimacy of reliance on
legislative intent in interpreting anti-discrimination legislation. This
is not an issue that is addressed directly in the Court's human rights
jurisprudence, perhaps because legislative intent has not figured so
prominently as the basis for any of the Court's previous decisions in
the area.79 Of course, the relevance of legislative intent can be taken
for granted in interpreting ordinary statutes. But, as the Court has re-
peatedly emphasized, anti-discrimination laws are not ordinary stat-
utes. The manner and degree to which legislative intent should be
relevant in interpreting a quasi-constitutional document, if it is rele-
vant at all, is not self-evident.
Most of the Court's decisions involving anti-discrimination law
since 1982 have emphasized the similarities between constitutional
and statutory human rights. The result has been a nearly complete
convergence of interpretive principles in the two domains. 80 In other
words, prior to Mossop, the Court had little to say about the implica-
tions of the "quasi" side of the quasi-constitutional status of anti-dis-
crimination statutes. The majority judgments in Mossop, on the other
hand, seem to dwell completely on the "quasi" side.
by L'Heureux-Dub6 J., supra note I at 620. The majority judges did not discuss
this evidence.
79 This is not to say that legislative intent has played no role in the Court's decisions
in this area. Occasional references to legislative intent, always in the context of
interpreting express statutory language, can be found in the Court's human rights
jurisprudence: see, e.g., Bhinder, supra note 67 at 571 per Dickson C.J. and at
579 per Wilson J.; Zurich, supra note 64 at 337 per Sopinka J. Indeed, it should
be acknowledged that even the Court's theory that anti-discrimination law is
quasi-constitutional in nature is an extrapolation from the legislative intent to
create fundamental fights. See Action Travail des Femmes, supra note 63 at 1134
per Dickson C.J. ("Human rights legislation is intended to give rise ... to
individual rights of vital importance").
80 For example, the interpretive approach taken to the Charter of Rights in cases like
Hunter v. Southam, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, dovetails with the one taken to
anti-discrimination statutes, described above in the text accompanying notes
58-71. However, the convergence in approach has not been total. For example,
the Court has applied the principle of dynamic interpretation, as embodied in the
"living tree" metaphor, to the Charter but has yet to do so explicitly with human




The weight given to legislative intent in Mossop is starkly at odds
with the Court's rejection of historical intent as a guide to constitu-
tional interpretation. The Supreme Court has stated that the Charter
of Rights, like the Constitution Act 1867, is a "living tree" capable of
growth and development over time. 81 A corollary of the principle of
interpretive dynamism embodied in the "living tree" metaphor is that
the intentions of the framers of the Charter are accorded very little
weight in interpretation. This is not because those intentions (if they
could be discovered) are necessarily wrong-headed, but simply be-
cause they are static and incomplete. In the Motor Vehicle Reference,
82
Lamer J. argued that the Charter must not be "frozen in time to the
moment of adoption with little or no possibility of growth". "Care must
be taken", he said, "to ensure that historical materials ... do not stunt
its growth.
83
The question that arises, of course, is whether the principle of in-
terpretive dynamism embodied in the living tree metaphor ought to
apply with the same force to the interpretation of anti-discrimination
statutes deemed to be of quasi-constitutional significance. Is it not
important that all rights deemed fundamental, regardless of their
source, be capable of growth and adaptation over time? If so, then an
argument exists that evidence of legislative intention should not pre-
vail over the results of a dynamic, purposive and generous interpreta-
tion.
On the other hand, we cannot ignore the fact that human rights stat-
utes are, after all, just statutes. They came into being through the or-
dinary legislative process in each of the thirteen Canadian jurisdic-
tions. The simple reason why these anti-discrimination statutes are
only quasi-constitutional is that they are not formally part of the Con-
stitution of Canada. Thus, unlike constitutional provisions, human
rights codes can be altered through the ordinary legislative process. It
follows, then, that the judiciary need not treat human rights legislation
as a "living tree" capable of outgrowing the original intent of the en-
81 The metaphor was first used to describe the 1867 Act in Edwards v. A.G. Canada,
[19301 A.C. 124, 136 (P.C.). For examples of references to the principle of
dynamic interpretation in the Charter jurisprudence, see Re B.C. Motor Vehicle
Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 at 509; Hunter v. Southamn, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 at 155
(Charter must be "capable of growth and development over time to meet new
social, political and historical realities often unimagined by its framers."); Mahe
v. Alberta, [1990] t S.C.R. 342 at 369. On the relevance of history to
constitutional interpretation generally, see Hogg, "Legislative History in
Constitutional Cases", in R.J. Sharpe ed., Charter Litigation (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1987) 131; K. Swinton, The Supreme Court and Canadian
Federalism (Toronto: Carswell, 1990) 117-129.
82 Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486.
83 Id. at 509. 1 do not want to suggest that the Court has adhered consistently to a
rejection of the framers' intention as a guide to Charter interpretation. For
example, the language of intention infuses the reasoning in A.G. Quebec v.
Quebec Protestant School Board, [ 1984] 2 S.C.R. 66 and in Dolphin Delivery v.
R. WD.S. U., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573. My point is simply that in theory the Court has
acknowledged that original intention should be accorded little weight in
constitutional interpretation.
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acting legislature, because the legislature is always free to pass amend-
ing legislation expanding the scope of human rights legislation. The
Mossop majority judges were probably on solid ground in assuming
that legislative intent ought to constrain the interpretation of anti-dis-
crimination statutes.
However, there are several considerations which suggest that the
Court should be extremely cautious about allowing arguments from
legislative intent to set the outer limits of human rights protections.
One such consideration is that the "quasi" side should not be al-
lowed to easily overwhelm the "constitutional" side of anti-discrimi-
nation statutes. That is, given the fundamental nature of the rights
promoted by anti-discrimination law, a generous and dynamic inter-
pretation should be pursued in the absence of a clear legislative direc-
tion to the contrary.
84
Furthermore, the fact that anti-discrimination statutes are only
quasi-constitutional cuts both ways in assessing whether the principle
of interpretive dynamism should be applied to the task of giving mean-
ing to their language. We have already noted that the judiciary need
not feel the same responsibility for dynamic interpretations as it should
in the constitutional context, because the legislature can advance statu-
tory protection from discrimination through the ordinary legislative
process. But for the same reason, there is less reason to be wary of
embarking on interpretations that the legislature may not have in-
tended. In the statutory context, the judiciary is relieved of the burden
of supremacy and finality that accompanies its constitutional deci-
sions. As L'Heureux-Dube J. pointed out in dissent, 85 the legislature
can always reverse judicial interpretation of a statute by passing
amending legislation.
In sum, because anti-discrimination statutes take the form (although
not the substance) of ordinary legislation, their interpretation is prop-
erly informed by legislative intent. However, the fundamental nature
of the rights involved, and the possibility of legislative alteration of
undesired interpretations, suggest that evidence of legislative inten-
tion should be clear and explicit before it is relied upon to curtail statu-
tory anti-discrimination protection.
4. Legislative Intent Before Mossop
An examination of the case law prior to Mossop reveals that the
Supreme Court had consistently followed the approach outlined in the
previous paragraph in interpreting anti-discrimination laws. The Court
has stated that only by "express and unequivocal language" 86 or "clear
legislative pronouncement" 87 will the legislature be permitted to di-
minish the protection afforded by anti-discrimination statutes.
For example, in Simpsons Sears, the Court made clear that argu-
ments relying on imputed legislative intent would be rejected if they
would have the effect of undermining the ability of human rights leg-
84 L'Heureux-DubW J. articulated this point in her dissent at 621.
85 Id. at 621.
86 Heerspink, supra note 58 at 158.
87 Craton, supra note 59 at 156.
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islation to sanction discriminatory practices. In that case, a provision
of the Ontario Human Rights Code prohibited unintentional discrimi-
nation on certain grounds, but did not include religion. An amendment
to the Code passed after the litigation commenced made clear that
unintentional religious discrimination was prohibited. Relying upon
these provisions, the Ontario courts reached the not unreasonable con-
clusion that the legislature did not intend to cover unintentional relig-
ious discrimination in the earlier version of the Code at issue.88 McIn-
tyre J., speaking for the Court, disagreed. Placing the advancement of
the broad purposes of the Code at the centre of his analysis, he found
that unintentional religious discrimination was prohibited.89
Further evidence of the rejection of a reliance on imputed legislative
intention as a guide to interpretation can be found in Janzen v. Platy
Enterprises.9° At issue in that case was a provision of the Manitoba
Human Rights Code that did not expressly prohibit sexual harassment.
Other provincial legislation did expressly prohibit sexual harassment,
as did a newly enacted version of the Manitoba legislation. Obviously
an argument existed in these circumstances along the lines accepted
by the majority in Mossop; that is, that the legislature could not have
intended sexual harassment to be prohibited in the earlier version of
the statute. But the Supreme Court held that the Manitoba Court of
Appeal was wrong to infer "that in the absence of such express legis-
lation a prohibition against sex discrimination could not embrace sex-
ual harassment." 91
Similarly, in Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd.,92 the Court found that
pregnancy discrimination was included in Manitoba's prohibition on
sex discrimination. This was so even though the Supreme Court had
previously held in Bliss93 that pregnancy discrimination was not sex
discrimination, and even though Manitoba, unlike several other prov-
inces, had not amended its human rights legislation to overcome Bliss
and explicitly prohibit pregnancy discrimination. Dickson C.J. re-
jected the argument that the legislature's inaction amounted to evi-
dence of an intention not to prohibit pregnancy discrimination.
94
Rather, he chose to advance the law, taking advantage of "a decade of
hindsight and ten years of experience with claims of human rights
discrimination and jurisprudence arising therefrom ....95
88 In Re OHRC v. Simpsons Sears (1982), 133 D.L.R. (3d) 611 (Ont. Div. Ct.),
Southey J. for the majority concluded that in light of the wording of the Code he
could not hold that "the Legislature intended the Code as now worded..." to cover
unintentional religious discrimination (at 616). The Ontario Court of Appeal
agreed with Southey J.'s analysis: (1982), 138 D.L.R. (3d) 133.
89 Supra note 61 at 547. See also the dissenting judgment of Dickson CJ. (Lamer
J. concurring) in Bhinder, supra note 67 at 571: "such reduction of the protection
of the individual from adverse effect discrimination under the Act would require
clear and explicit words to that effect."
90 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1252.
91 Id. at 1286.
92 Supra note 67.
93 Bliss v. A.G. Canada, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183.
94 Supra note 92 at 1250.
95 Id. at 1243.
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In short, the Court has indeed treated anti-discrimination law as a
"living tree" capable of growth and expansion over time. This expan-
sion has been accomplished by reference to the overall purposes of
anti-discrimination legislation as the guide to interpretation. Unlike
the constitution, the growth of human rights statutes is ultimately con-
strained by legislative intention, but that intention will be permitted to
diminish the scope of protection against discrimination only when it
is clear and explicit. Arguments based on an imputed or presumed
limiting legislative intent, derived from legislative silence or inaction,
have been repeatedly rejected prior to the Mossop case.
5. Legislative Intent After Mossop: The Berg Decision
It is too early to say whether the majority decision in Mossop is an
aberration or a signal that the Court is embarking on a more restrictive
approach to the interpretation of human rights legislation. The early
indications suggest that the former interpretation will turn out to be
correct.
In U.B.C. v. Berg,96 Lamer C.J. stated that courts and tribunals
should give a prohibition on discrimination "a liberal and purposive
construction, without reading the limiting words out of the Act or oth-
erwise circumventing the intention of the legislature.'97 The under-
lined words represent the legacy of Mossop: the Court may be willing
to find a limiting legislative intention in something other than the ex-
plicit language of the Act itself. Nevertheless, in Berg, the Court went
on to give a purposive interpretation to the disputed phrase "services
customarily available to the public" in upholding the tribunal's deci-
sion that the complainant had suffered discrimination on the grounds
of mental disability. Lamer C.J. rejected the "overly restrictive" 98 in-
terpretation of public services offered by the British Columbia Court
of Appeal. He characterized the similarly narrow approach taken by
the Supreme Court in the 1979 Gay Alliance decision as "subversive
of the purpose of human rights legislation". 99 In concluding, Lamer
C.J. commented that:
The Act must be allowed its full scope of application, and its particular
operation in situations such as this, if undesirable, is a matter for legislative
attention. The recent amendments to the Act show that such responses are
always possible. 100
Thus, the Berg decision represents a return to a conception of the
relationship between the courts and the legislatures typical of the pre-
Mossop case law: the courts will advance dynamic and generous in-
terpretations, and the legislatures are free to disagree by passing clear
and explicit limiting language.' 0' Of course, gay men and lesbians will
96 Supra note 67.
97 Id. at 371 (emphasis added).
98 Id. at 394.
99 Id. at 381.
100 Id. at 394.
101 Subject, of course, to the significant limits now imposed on the exercise of




find little comfort in the knowledge that the restrictive interpretations
emerging from the Court's two gay rights cases, Gay Alliance and
Mossop, do not appear to be unduly hampering the Court's develop-
ment of anti-discrimination jurisprudence as a whole.
6. Interactive Discrimination
Interactive discrimination is a term used by scholars to describe
discrimination that cannot be analyzed adequately through the lens of
a single prohibited ground of discrimination. This is because a per-
son's identity, and the way he or she is perceived by others, is fre-
quently a product of multiple characteristics that are inseparably part
of the whole person. As Jody Freeman has argued, "[d]iscrimination
may have no "core" motivation or effect; it may emanate from shifting
and multiple sites, and have complicated effects."' 0 2 Thus, if we are
to fully grasp the effects of discriminatory practices on those experi-
encing them, we need to incorporate into anti-discrimination jurispru-
dence a recognition that grounds of discrimination overlap and interact
in complex ways. As the intervenors EGALE et al. put it in their fac-
turn, "[t]he experience of discrimination is not neatly divisible into
watertight compartments."' 03
For example, in her thorough study of Canadian race and sex dis-
crimination case law, Nitya Iyer found that tribunals and courts effec-
tively ignore the reality of combined race and sex discrimination ex-
perienced by racial minority women. 10 4 She noted that interlocking
racial and sexual stereotypes are often responsible for discriminatory
practices experienced by racial minority women, yet courts and tribu-
nals have tended to view the problem through the sole lens of either
sex or race discrimination. As a result, racial minority women are
made to "disappear" from the jurisprudence. She concludes that:
The current categorical approach to the grounds of discrimination leads to
depictions of the experience of discrimination that are seriously inadequate in
a significant number of cases.] 05
She urges that we need "a legal description that is sophisticated
enough to correspond to the lived experience of discrimination" in
order to "build an antidiscrimination law that truly begins to redress
it."106 This will involve a "consideration of the complex interactions
of race, sex, and the various other grounds of discrimination that are
so much a part of the lived experience (as opposed to the legal analysis)
of discrimination."
' 107
The assertion that the Mossop case was "really" about sexual ori-
entation, rather than family status, is a classic example of the flawed
102 Freeman, supra note 3 at 80.
103 At para 15. L'Heureux-Dub, J. adopted this perspective in her dissent in Mossop,
supra note I at 645-7.
104 Duclos (lyer), "Disappearing Women: Racial Minority Women in Human Rights
Cases" (1993) 6 C.J.W.L. 25.
105 Id. at 36.
106 Id. at 50.
107 Id. at 40. Iyer develops these ideas further in her article "Categorical Denials:
Equality Rights and the Shaping of Social Identity" (1993) 19 Queen's L.J. 179.
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categorical approach to discrimination identified by Iyer and other
scholars. As Freeman has stated, this "categorization game" enabled
the Federal Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court majority "to avoid
considering family status entirely, as if, because Mossop is gay, non-
recognition of his family ceases to be an issue."'0 8 It also may be a
reflection of the broader tendency in this culture to define gay men
and lesbians solely in terms of their sexuality, as if there are no other
meaningful dimensions to their lives.
It is hard to understand the assertion that Mossop's complaint was
not "really" about family status discrimination. Mossop, after all, was
denied an employment benefit because of non-recognition of relation-
ships he considered familial. His relationship to Popert Sr. obviously
developed in the context of his relationship to his lover, Popert Jr. But
the relationship between Mossop and Popert Jr. should not be reduced
solely to its sexual dimension, which is what the Court risks doing by
saying the case is really only about sexual orientation. For the purposes
of bereavement leave, it is the nature of the emotional connections
between persons that is most relevant, rather than whether those con-
nections originate in a relationship that has a sexual dimension or not.
At the same time, we cannot ignore that the definition of family in
the collective agreement excluded all same-sex couples, and that this
non-recognition is closely, indeed inseparably, connected to discrimi-
natory attitudes to gay men and lesbians that lead to the denial of the
reality and value of their relationships. The discrimination experi-
enced by Mossop can best be understood as resulting from the inter-
action of both his family status and his sexual orientation. It can also
be understood, although incompletely, as resulting from either his
family status or sexual orientation alone.
The judgment of Lamer C.J. is problematic not only because he
adopted the questionable tactic of labelling Mossop's complaint as
really only about sexual orientation, but also because he used a recog-
nition of the interaction of the grounds of discrimination to subtract
from the scope of protection provided by human rights statutes. The
following diagram, while overly simplistic, may help illustrate this
point:
1-Sexual Orientation 2-Family Status
Circle 1 represents the sphere of activities prohibited by sexual orien-
tation discrimination. Circle 2 represents the sphere of activities prohibited
by family status discrimination. Thus, area A represents discrimination
108 Freeman, supra note 3 at 74.
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against gay men and lesbians as individuals; area C represents discrimi-
nation against the family relationships of persons .for reasons unrelated
to their sexual orientation; and area B represents the area of overlap and
interplay, namely discrimination against gay and lesbian families.
In his judgment in Mossop, rather than employing the usual inter-
pretive approach to give all of circle 2 a generous and purposive in-
terpretation, Lamer C.J. found a Parliamentary intent to shrink the
scope of family status by excluding area B from the coverage of the
Act. On a strict categorical approach to grounds of discrimination,
Parliament's exclusion of sexual orientation discrimination would be
irrelevant to the interpretation of family status discrimination. Here,
however, Lamer C.J. recognized that the two grounds of discrimina-
tion overlap. This recognition enabled him to rely on Parliament's
failure to include sexual orientation discrimination as a reason to di-
minish the scope of prohibited family status discrimination. 09
The difficulty of this reasoning is that it looks at only one side of
the contradictory Parliamentary signals sent out with respect to area
B, the zone of overlapping discrimination. On the one hand, Parlia-
ment has excluded all of circle I from the coverage of the Act. On the
other hand, it has included all of circle 2 (without express qualifica-
tion) within the Act. On what basis is it possible to conclude that Par-
liament clearly intended to exclude all complaints that fall within area
B? Why should a result that inhibits the achievement of the objects of
the Act be selected in the face of such contradictory signals? Lamer
C.J. argued that any other result would be "somewhat surprising; while
homosexuals who are not couples would receive no protection under
the Act, those who are would be protected."'" 0 But it is no less surpris-
ing that heterosexual families receive protection under the Act, while
gay or lesbian families receive none.
The Mossop majority provides support for the following proposi-
tion: the omission of a ground of discrimination from human rights
legislation has the effect of diminishing other grounds of discrimina-
tion by removing from their scope all areas of interactive or overlap-
ping discrimination with the missing ground. This "subtractive" thesis
is one that if followed could have alarming consequences for anti-dis-
crimination law. This is because, as L'Heureux-Dub6 J. stated in dis-
sent, "though multiple levels of discrimination may exist, multiple
levels of protection may not."' I IFor example, in jurisdictions where
the Mossop situation is reversed, that is, where sexual orientation dis-
crimination is prohibited but family status discrimination is not,"
2
109 The good news is that the meaning of family status may expand once sexual
orientation is added to the Act, as it now appears to be. Lamer C.J. stated that "if
Parliament had decided to include sexual orientation in the list of prohibited
grounds of discrimination, my interpretation of the phrase 'family status' might
have been entirely different and 1 might perhaps then have concluded that Mr.
Mossop's situation included both his sexual orientation and his 'family status"',
supra note I at 582.
11o Id. at 581.
III Id. at 646.
112 This is the case under the New Brunswick legislation, and also in B.C. with respect
to discrimination in real estate transactions.
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could it be argued that the legislature intended to exclude discrimina-
tion against gay and lesbian couples? Could it be argued that since the
Criminal Code hate propaganda section prohibits inciting hatred
against groups distinguished by certain characteristics including race,
but excluding sex, 13 that Parliament did not intend to capture persons
inciting hatred against racial minority women? The dangers of Lamer
C.J.'s "subtractive" approach once again underline the need to insist
that judges find a legislative intent to limit the scope of anti-discrimi-
nation statutes only in cases where the legislature has made its inten-
tion clear and unequivocal.
V. THE STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF HUMAN
RIGHTS TRIBUNALS
1. The Mossop Judgments on the Standard of Review
The majority judgments in Mossop held that the Court should show
no deference, on ajudicial review application brought pursuant to s.28
of the Federal Court Act, to decisions on questions of law made by a
Canadian Human Rights Tribunal. Six members of the Court held the
Tribunal to a "correctness" test; that is, the Tribunal result could stand
only if the judges agreed with it. L'Heureux-Dub6 J. was alone in
favouring the deferential "patently unreasonable" test; that is, she
would defer to the Tribunal's interpretation of the Act unless it could
be shown to be "patently unreasonable".
La Forest J. wrote the principal opinion for the 6-1 majority of the
Court in Mossop on the standard of review issue."14 He noted that,
even in the absence of a privative clause, the courts do show deference
to administrative tribunals on questions involving tribunal members'
specialized expertise. Thus, the absence of a privative clause in the
CHRA was not the decisive factor in determining the standard of re-
view. The crucial question, rather, was defining the sphere of expertise
possessed by human rights tribunal members. In La Forest J.'s view,
human rights tribunals have no special expertise in giving meaning to
the language of anti-discrimination statutes. "These", he said, "are
ultimately matters within the province of the judiciary, and involve
concepts of statutory interpretation and general legal reasoning which
the courts must be supposed competent to perform."' 15
L'Heureux-Dub6 J. was the only member of the Court who dis-
sented from this approach. In her view, the interpretation of the pro-
hibited grounds of discrimination in the Act "is a matter that lay at the
heart of the Tribunal's specialized jurisdiction and expertise"."16 She
would only interfere with tribunal decisions on such questions if they
were "patently unreasonable".' '7 She concluded that the Tribunal de-
cision was not at all unreasonable, because it accorded with "the pro-
113 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-46, s.318(4), s.319.
114 In their separate judgments, Lamer C. (at 578), Cory J. (at 648) and McLachlin
J. (at.648-9) all agreed with La Forest J. on the appropriate standard of review.
115 Supra note I at 585.
116 Id. at 635.
''7 Id. at 647.
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per interpretational approach and considered the purpose of the Act
and the values at the base of the protection of families"." 1
8
2. Getting It Right: The Adoption of the Correctness Standard
of Review in Mossop, Zurich, Dickason and Berg
The Mossop decision was the third of four Supreme Court decisions
decided in the past two years that have thrown a close net of judicial
supervision around the decisions of human rights tribunals. These de-
cisions as a whole represent a sweeping dismissal of the possibility
that human rights tribunals might be better placed than the courts when
it comes to interpreting anti-discrimination statutes.
In the first decision, Zurich Insurance Co. v. Ontario,119 a majority
of the Court found that the courts should not defer to the legal find-
ings of Boards of Inquiry when hearing a statutory appeal from a
Board decision. This was not a particularly surprising result in light
of the structure of the Ontario Human Rights Code.'20 The Code con-
tains no privative clause, nor any other provision signalling a legisla-
tive intent to insulate Board of Inquiry rulings from judicial interfer-
ence. Moreover, the appeal provision of the Code is broadly worded,
permitting an appeal' 2' on questions of "law or fact or both", and
specifying that the appellate court "may substitute its opinion for that
of the Board". 22 Sopinka J. concluded that there should be no curial
deference to findings of law "in which the Board has no particular
expertise". 23 As in Mossop, L'Heureux-Dub6 J. dissented. She as-
serted a broader conception of curial deference based on her accep-
tance of the superior expertise of Boards of Inquiry in human rights
matters. 
24
In Dickason v. University of Alberta125 a 4-3 majority of the Court
carried its interventionist approach a step further. Like the Ontario
legislation, the Alberta Individual's Rights Protection Act 26 contains
a provision expressly contemplating an appeal on the law or facts from
a Board of Inquiry decision. 127 Cory J. stated that curial deference was
unwarranted because board members lacked specialized skill and
knowledge. Even on findings of fact, he held that a Board is owed "no
particular deference" by an appellate court. 28 The dissenting judg-
ments of Sopinka and L'Heureux-Dub6 JJ. argued in favour of the
usual rule of deference to the findings of triers of fact. L'Heureux-
Dub6 J. argued that the majority's "sweeping dismissal of the role of
118 Id. at 635.
119 Supra note 64.
120 R.S.O. 1990, c.H.19.
121 Section 42(1).
122 Section 42(3).
'23 Supra note 119 at 338.
124 Id, at 360-3, 377.
12 Supra note 66.
126 R.S.A. 1980, c.I-2.
127 Section 33.
128 Supra note 66 at 1126.
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the Board"'129 overlooks the "signal advantage"' 130 that courts of first
instance and administrative tribunals have in assessing evidence.
The judgments in Zurich and Dickason established that, where anti-
discrimination statutes contain broadly worded appeal clauses, the
court will review the legal findings of a tribunal on a correctness test.
Indeed, given the posture of the Court in these two cases, it is safe to
assume that the correctness standard will be used on appeals from
legal decisions of human rights tribunals where two conditions are
met: 1) the human rights legislation contains an appeal clause on
questions of law; and 2) the legislation contains no privative or final-
ity clause indicating a legislative intent to insulate the legal findings
of tribunals from judicial interference. Thus, in addition to Alberta
and Ontario, the Zurich and Dickason decisions likely mean that the
correctness standard will apply to decisions of law made by tribunals
in Saskatchewan,' 3' Nova Scotia,132 Newfoundland, 3 3 the Northwest
Territories, 134 and the Yukon. 135 For reasons to be discussed below, 136
Quebec is the only jurisdiction in the country where some deference
is likely to be shown on appeals of a human rights tribunal's legal
findings.
The Zurich and Dickason cases did not resolve the question of
whether the standard of review ought to be different in anti-discrimi-
nation statutes that do not contain appeal clauses. In that situation,
tribunal decisions are subject only to the ordinary supervisory juris-
diction of the courts on judicial review applications. As the Court has
remarked on another occasion, there is a "basic difference" between
an appeal and judicial review: "jurisdiction of a court on appeal is
much broader than the jurisdiction of a court on judicial review."'
137
An appeal clause, after all, is a fairly clear indication by the legislature
that it intended the courts to closely scrutinize the legal decisions of a
tribunal. By contrast, if there is no appeal clause, and thus judicial
review is the sole supervisory mechanism, the legislature appears to
be signalling that it is the tribunal that ought to have primary respon-
sibility for the interpretation of its constitutive legislation.
Thus, in a statute like the CHRA, where there is no appeal clause,
there is reason to believe that Parliament intended a narrower scope
of judicial supervision than in the jurisdictions where appeal clauses
are included in human rights legislation. In this regard, the quite un-
derstandable lack of deference the Court extended to the legal deci-
sions of tribunals on the appeals in Zurich and Dickason should not
129 Id. at 1148.
130 Id.
131 Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, S.S. 1979, c.S-24.1, s.32(l) (appeal on
question of law).
132 Human Rights Act, R.S.N.S. 1979, c.214, s.36(1) (appeal on question of law).
133 Human Rights Code, R.S.N. 1990, c.H-14, s.31 (appeal on question of fact or
law).
134 Fair Practices Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c.F-2, s.8 (appeal by trial de novo).
135 Human Rights Act, R.S.Y. 1986, c. It, s.26(1) (appeal on question of law).
136 Infra note 154 and accompanying text.
137 Bell Canada v. Canada (CRTC), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1722 at 1745 per Gonthier J.
for a unanimous Court.
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have automatically led to the adoption of the same correctness stand-
ard in Mossop. Yet the majority opinions do just that, obliterating the
distinction between an appeal and judicial review. 138 Indeed, this as-
pect of the majority decisions seems at odds with their apparent sen-
sitivity to evidence of Parliamentary intent in the substantive portions
of their judgments.
L'Heureux-Dub J. did give adequate weight to the structure of the
CHRA, and thus was able to distinguish the earlier holdings in Zurich
and Dickason. 139 Nevertheless, her adoption of the patently unreason-
able test seems too deferential given the lack of a privative clause in
the legislation and the ad hoc nature of human rights tribunals. It is
hard to understand why the pendulum could not settle somewhere be-
tween the extremes of the correctness and patently unreasonable
tests.1
40
Finally, in U.B.C. v. Berg,141 the Court ratified the approach adopted
in Mossop. The British Columbia Human Rights Act,142 like the
CHRA, contained no appeal clause and no privative clause. Tribunals
were subject to the ordinary supervision of the courts under the B.C.
Judicial Review Procedure Act. 143 Lamer C.J., writing for a unani-
mous Court on this point, 144 followed Mossop in holding that the tri-
bunal had no particular expertise on "general questions of law with
wide social implications".' 45 L'Heureux-Dub6 J. finally gave up the
ghost: she abandoned her lonely defence of the expertise of human
rights tribunals by joining Lamer C.J.'s opinion.
The decisions in Mossop and Berg thus extend the correctness
standard of review on legal questions to jurisdictions in which anti-
discrimination statutes contain neither an appeal clause nor a privative
or finality clause. In addition to the B.C. legislation and the federal
CHRA, the P.E.I. legislation falls into this category. 146 The Manitoba
and New Brunswick statutes have no appeal clause, yet the inclusion
of finality clauses suggest that some degree of curial deference is war-
ranted on judicial review proceedings. 1
47
138 Lamer C.J. said that the Zurich reasoning "should have put the matter to rest" in
the Mossop case as well (supra note 1 at 578). He made no comment indicating
a lesser standard of review in judicial review proceedings generally.
139 Id. at 609.
140 See, for example, the "reasonableness" standard proposed by Gonthier J. in Bell
Canada, supra note 153 at 1746, and by the Ontario Court in Ontario (Solicitor
General) v. Ontario (Assistant Information and Privacy Commissioner) (1993)
12 Admin. L.R. (2d) 300 (Ont. Div. Ct.). See also the criticism of the radical
differences in the levels of judicial review in Janisch, "Towards a More General
Theory of Judicial Review in Administrative Law" (1989) 53 Sask. L. Rev. 327
at 329-30.
141 Supra note 67.
142 S.B.C. 1984, c.22. The Act at issue in Berg was substantially amended in 1992
(S.B.C. 1992, c.42), but still contains neither an appeal clause nor a privative or
finality clause.
143 R.S.B.C. 1979, c.209.
144 Major J. dissented on other grounds.
145 Supra note 141 at 369.
146 Human Rights Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c.H-12.
147 In Manitoba, under the Human Rights Code, S.M. 1987-88, c.45 (C.C.S.M.,
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In sum, the four recent Supreme Court decisions set out a sweeping
policy of judicial intervention with respect to the legal decisions of
human rights tribunals. With the probable exceptions of Quebec, Man-
itoba and New Brunswick, the legal decisions of human rights tribu-
nals across the country will be upheld by the courts on appeal orjudi-
cial review only if they "got it right", that is, only if the courts agree
with them.
The Court has made clear that, in its view, human rights tribunals
fall on the weak end of the spectrum of Canadian administrative bod-
ies. Significant constraints have thus been placed on the development
of an autonomous body of jurisprudence by human rights tribunals. 1
48
And persons bringing complaints under human rights statutes, already
facing intolerable delays in the processing of complaints in many ju-
risdictions, have to contend with the further delays resulting from ap-
peals and judicial review applications encouraged by the Supreme
Court's policy of judicial intervention.
3. The Weaknesses of the Current Tribunal System of
Adjudication
In fairness to the Supreme Court, the main responsibility for the
lack of respect it has accorded to the legal decisions of human rights
tribunals has to rest with Canadian legislatures. None of the thirteen
Canadian anti-discrimination statutes contains a strong privative
clause and, as we have seen, most include appeal clauses. Moreover,
tribunals are appointed on an ad hoc basis to adjudicate particular
disputes. Adjudicators are drawn from a list of part-time appointees,
and are most commonly practicing lawyers or law professors. While
they may well have great experience with and sensitivity to human
rights issues, the legislation typically makes no attempt to ensure that
adjudicators possess such qualifications. Indeed, with the exception
of the Quebec legislation, Canadian anti-discrimination statutes con-
c.H175), an adjudicator has a duty to render a final decision (s.41) and has
"exclusive jurisdiction and authority to determine any question of fact, law or
mixed fact and law that must be decided in completing the adjudication and in
rendering a final decision respecting the complaint" (s.42). Moreover, s.49
provides that "every decision and order made by an adjudicator is final and
binding on the parties to the adjudication." While s.50 provides explicitly that a
court may review for jurisdictional error, denial of natural justice or fairness, or
for an error of law on the face of the record, the legislature's use of the language
of finality and exclusiveness in relation to the adjudicator's decision suggests that
a degree of curial deference is appropriate. The same is true in New Brunswick,
where s.21 (1) of the Human Rights Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c.H-'l I (as amended by
S.N.B. 1985, c.30) provides that "[a]lI orders and decisions of a Board of Inquiry
are final ... "
148 Further constraints on the development of an autonomous body of human rights
jurisprudence by tribunals result from the fact that the Charter now has an
important impact on the shape of anti-discrimination legislation (see supra note
71). Tribunal decisions on Charter issues receive no curial deference from the
courts (Cuddy Chicks v. O.L.R.B., [1991] 2 S.C.R. 5, 17; Douglas-Kwantlen
Faculty Association v. Douglas College, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 570, 605).
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tain no qualifications whatsoever for appointment to the list of poten-
tial adjudicators.
The 1992 Report of the Ontario Human Rights Code Review Task
Force (the Cornish Report) 149 has many useful recommendations for
legislative correction of the weaknesses in the current structure of hu-
man rights adjudication. The Task Force makes clear that it does not
share the view of the Supreme Court that courts are better situated to
interpret human rights legislation. On the contrary, the Task Force
argues that human rights tribunals were established "precisely because
the courts demonstrated a lack of knowledge and understanding of
human rights. ' 1 0 Nevertheless, the Report does identify a number of
weaknesses in the current tribunal system. For example:
Since Board of Inquiry members are only involved part-time and on a transitory
basis with no certainty as to how much work they will be assigned, they usually
have other full-time jobs. This causes problems in scheduling hearings with
resulting unacceptable delays, as well as difficulty in building consistency,
expertise and training among adjudicators.
15 1
The Cornish Report recommended that the "unstructured, ad hoc
manner of setting up human rights hearings" be replaced by a "per-
manent expert Tribunal" with "a permanent panel of trained, qualified
human rights Adjudicators".15 2 The Report further recommended that
tribunal decisions be protected from judicial interference by a strong
privative clause in order to minimize uncertainties, delays and ex-
penses associated with inexpert interference by the courts. 153
A fundamental reconsideration of the structure of adjudication un-
der human rights legislation is a matter deserving legislative attention.
Thus far, only the Quebec legislature has created a stronger adminis-
trative tribunal system. 1 4 The Quebec Charter of Human Rights and
Freedoms now establishes a tribunal composed of seven members
who hold office for a period of five years (s. 101). The President must
be a judge of the Superior Court. The Charter sets out specific quali-
fications for eligibility for appointment to the Tribunal: arbitrators and
tribunal members must have "notable experience and expertise in, sen-
sitivity to and interest for matters of human rights and freedoms"
(ss.62, 101 and 103). Section 109 ousts judicial review by the Superior
Court except on questions of jurisdiction. Section 132 provides that
any final decision of the Tribunal may be appealed to the Court of
Appeal if leave is granted. Notwithstanding the availability of appel-
late and jurisdictional review, the provisions regarding expertise
149 Ontario Human Rights Code Review Task Force (Mary Cornish, Chair),
Achieving Equality: A Report on Human Rights Reform (Toronto: Policy Services
Branch, Ministry of Citizenship, 1992).
150 Id. at 94.
151 Id. at 108-9.
152 Id. at 109.
153 Id. at 149. See also the Canadian Human Rights Commission, Annual Report
1989 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1990) at 60, where a
recommendation is made for similar changes to the the structure of adjudication
under the federal Act.
154 Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q. 1977, c.C-12, as amended by
S.Q. 1989, c.5 1.
Vol 13
Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice
should entitle Quebec tribunal decisions to a higher degree of defer-
ence than those of human rights tribunals elsewhere in the country.
4. The Question of Relative Expertise
Despite the obvious deficiencies in existing Canadian legislation, it
is nonetheless difficult to build the case that human rights tribunals
are less qualified to interpret anti-discrimination statutes than the
Courts. The question of deference, after all, is essentially a question
of relative expertise: who is better placed to decide these questions?
When the legislature has sent no clear signals about its own views on
these questions - as in the case of the CHRA -judges are necessarily
cast in the role of experts on the question of relative expertise. The
self-interested nature of judicial inquiry on this issue ought to call for
a certain degree of humility. When Supreme Court justices decide not
to accord any deference to tribunal decisions, they are saying that "we
judges have superior expertise here". But are judges better equipped,
so that, as La Forest J. put it, anti-discrimination law should fall within
"the province of the judiciary"? What is the basis of this judicial claim
to expertise superior to that of human fights adjudicators on discrimi-
nation law?
Most adjudicators are likely to be quite similar to judges in terms
of their legal training and experience. However, all judges must have
substantial legal training and experience to qualify for appointment to
the bench; human rights adjudicators, on the other hand, may have no
legal experience whatsoever. While other kinds of experience and a
sensitivity to human rights issues may be equally or more important
qualifications than legal experience, there is no guarantee in jurisdic-
tions other than Quebec that human rights adjudicators will possess
those qualifications either. As a result, the range in the competence of
human rights adjudicators is likely to be a large one (the same could
also be said of the range of judicial competence on human rights is-
sues). Nevertheless, if we are willing to take a leap of faith and assume
a measure of rationality in the appointments processes, 55 perhaps we
could conclude that adjudicators should be more likely than judges to
have specialized knowledge and expertise on human rights matters.
Judges, after all, are appointed for general legal knowledge and ex-
pertise, while adjudicators are appointed to deal with a specialized
body of human rights law. Yet it is true that the part-time, ad hoc nature
of appointments means that adjudicators have limited opportunities to
accumulate expertise. Judges, of course, now have greater opportunity
than they previously did to develop expertise on discrimination law
155 Such a leap of faith may not be justified. For example, the authors of the review
of Canadian tribunal members set out in (1990) 6(9) Can. Hum. Rights Adv. 1-8
argue that patronage, gender bias and a lack of care in ensuring the sensitivity of
tribunal members are prominent features of the appointments process. See also
Flanagan, Knopff and Archer, "Selection Bias in Human Rights Tribunals: An
Exploratory Study" (1988) 31 Can. Pub. Admin. 483, in which the authors express
doubts about "the neutrality of a system that required ad hoc, external appointment
of adjudicators by the political executive" (at 499).
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since the coming into force of the Charter equality rights provisions
in 1985.
Weighing all these factors, it does not seem that a comparison of
human rights adjudicators and judges is likely to yield a conclusion
one way or the other on the question of superior relative expertise. One
is left wondering exactly how the Court would sustain its assertion
that the judiciary has superior expertise on anti-discrimination law
relative to human rights adjudicators. It seems likely that ultimate ju-
dicial responsibility for the interpretation of the Charter, and the s. 15
equality rights in particular, is a large part of the explanation for the
Court's new-found sense of institutional confidence on discrimination
law.156 It also seems likely that one of the reasons the Supreme Court
judges have little confidence in the quality of decision-making by hu-
man rights adjudicators is the lack of any guarantees that adjudicators
will have sensitivity to or expertise on questions of discrimination. We
do not know for sure because the judges asked us to take on faith their
simple assertion of superior relative expertise on "general questions
of law".
In this sense, the Supreme Court decisions on the standard of review
of human rights tribunals appear to rest ultimately on a kind of legal
fundamentalism. That is, law is law, policy is policy, and discrimina-
tion law is law not policy. Law is a matter of right answers; policy
entails choices between competing goals. Legal decisions require a
generalist legal training, while policy decisions require a more spe-
cialized knowledge, expertise or sensitivity. Despite the obvious dif-
ficulties of unravelling the legal and policy elements of human rights
adjudication, something like this set of assumptions must underlie La
Forest J.'s assertion that a tribunal's superior expertise "does not ex-
tend to general questions of law such as the one at issue"'157 in Mossop.
The possibility that adjudicators may have an advantage in interpreting
their "home statute" by virtue of their specialization in the area of
human rights thus need not be discussed, for they have no special claim
to expertise in the "general law" of which anti-discrimination law is
said to be a part. 5
8
156 See the prescient comments of Alison Harvison Young in "Keeping the Courts
at Bay: The Canadian Human Rights Commission and Its Counterparts in Britain
and Northern Ireland: Some Comparative Lessons" (1993) 43 U.T.L.J. 65.
Writing before the Mossop and Berg decisions, she noted that the Charter
encourages the courts to think of themselves as the "guardians and watchdogs of
human rights" and that "[tlhis development may turn out to be another example
of the remarkable historic tendency of the ordinary courts to sustain and enlarge
their roles" (at 72). See also Young, "Human Rights Tribunals and the Supreme
Court of Canada: Reformulating Deference" (1993) 13 Admin. L.R. (2d) 206.
157 Supra note I at 585.
158 It is not unusual for the Court to deny that tribunals have expertise on questions
of general law. See, e.g., McLeod v. Egan, [ 1975] S.C.R. 517; Dayco (Canada)
Ltd. v. CAW, 11993] 2 S.C.R. 230 (labour arbitrator has no special expertise on
common law concepts; only entitled to deference when interpreting "home
territory"). What is unusual is for the Court to say that the specialized statute under
which a tribunal operates is part of the "general law" on which no deference is
warranted.
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Mossop and the other three decisions dealing with the standard of
review of human rights tribunals may be part of a larger phenomenon
of legal fundamentalism creeping interstitially back into the Court's
administrative law jurisprudence. As administrative law scholars have
pointed out, the 1979 C. U.P.E. 159 decision signalled the abandonment
of the view that interpretative techniques could "provide the uniquely
"correct" meaning of legislation".' 60 The denial of the interweaving
of law and policy, and the insistence on a single correct interpretation
of the meaning of "family status", are features of the Mossop decision
that signal the persistence of the legal fundamentalism dominant in
the pre-C. U.P.E. era administrative jurisprudence.
5. Homosexuality in "the Province of the Judiciary"
Finally, I want to conclude with some comments on the Court's
assertion that the specific issues in Mossop are ones that fall within
the larger realm of the judiciary's superior expertise on "general
questions of law". In particular, does the Supreme Court's institu-
tional record in cases involving gay and lesbian rights or litigants
support the majority's claim to special institutional competence? An
examination of the record reveals that any expertise possessed by
the Supreme Court in this area is a peculiar form of expertise in-
deed.
Consider, for example, the Court's 1967 decision in Klippert.16 In
that case, a 3-2 majority of the Supreme Court upheld the sentencing
of a gay man to an indefinite prison term for no crime other than
engaging in acts of consensual oral sex with adult men, and for hon-
estly (and naively as it turned out) admitting that he was likely to do
so again in the future. The majority judgment of Fauteux J. found that
this behaviour and admission properly qualified Klippert as a "dan-
gerous sexual offender". As in Mossop, the majority disclaimed any
interpretive responsibility for the result; it was simply a matter of giv-
ing effect to Parliamentary intent. In Fauteux J.'s judgment, the intent
and object of the Act could be found in its "clear provisions";' 62 all he
could do was "interpret and apply laws validly enacted."' 163 In his dis-
senting judgment, Cartwright J. made the quite sensible suggestion
that the dangerous sexual offender definition should be limited to per-
sons likely to commit further sexual offences "involving an element
of danger to another person."'164 He was pleased tobe able to arrive at
this result for, unlike the majority, he did not want to impute to Par-
liament the intent to lock up indefinitely "a sexual offender who is not
dangerous". 165 This was because "however loathsome" gay sexuality
159 C.U.P.E., Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor Corp., [1979] 2 S.C.R. 227.
16o Evans, "Developments in Administrative Law: The 1984-85 Term" (1986) 8 Sup.
Ct. L. Rev. 1, 28.
161 Klippert v. R. [1967] S.C.R. 822.
162 Id. at 835.
163 Id. at 836.




"may appear to all normal persons, I think it improbable that Parlia-
ment intended such a result."'
166
In the 1979 Gay Alliance 67 case, the Supreme Court overturned a
Board of Inquiry decision that had found that the Vancouver Sun had
violated the B.C. Human Rights Code by refusing to print a classified
advertisement for a "gay lib paper". The B.C. legislation contained a
general prohibition on discrimination without "reasonable cause". The
Sun had refused to run the ad on the grounds that "homosexuality is
offensive to public decency", the ad "would offend some of its sub-
scribers", and the paper "had a duty to protect the morals of the com-
munity".' 68 The British Columbia Court of Appeal held that these rea-
sons constituted "reasonable cause" for the Sun's actions. On appeal,
the Supreme Court was thus presented with an excellent opportunity
to clearly refute the proposition that heterosexist attitudes justify het-
erosexist practices, a rather alarming proposition for the interpretation
of anti-discrimination statutes. Instead of seizing this opportunity, the
Supreme Court majority decided that the prohibition on discrimination
did not apply to a newspaper's provision of classified advertising serv-
ices. Even if it did, Martland J. seemed to suggest that the Sun was
free to take a position on "the controversial subject of homosexual-
ity"'169 and reject the ad on the basis of its opposition to equal rights
for gay men and lesbians. In his opinion, the Sun's refusal of the ad
"was not based upon any personal characteristics of the person seeking
to place that advertisement, but upon the content of the advertisement
itself."170 Only Laskin J., in his dissenting judgment, was willing to
make the obvious point that the view that bias against homosexuals
justifies discrimination is "destructive" of the policy embodied in hu-
man rights legislation.' 7 '
Finally, in the 1986 decision of R. v. Hill,172 both the majority and
166 Id. at 831. See also R. v. Lupien, [1970] S.C.R. 263, for another example of a
Supreme Court decision that takes for granted both that heterosexuality is
"normal" and that homosexuality is "perverse" and "criminal". The accused in
that case tried to introduce psychiatric evidence showing that he was, in Ritchie
J.'s words, a "normal man" (at 275), and thus incapable of committing gross
indecency with another man. The majority refused to allow the evidence solely
on the grounds that its admission would offend the ultimate issue rule. Ritchie J.,
dissenting, would have admitted the evidence. In his opinion, "crimes involving
homosexuality stand in a class by themselves in the sense that the participants
frequently have characteristics which make them more readily identifiable as a
class than ordinary criminals" (at 277-8).
167 Supra note 2.
168 Id. at 442-3.
169 Id. at 455-6.
170 Id. at 456.
171 Id. at 444. The academic commentary on the GayAlliance decision was uniformly
negative. See Goreham (1981) 59 Can. Bar Rev. 165 at 179 ("The die is already
cast, there is little left to argue, when an individual's homosexuality is by
definition considered to be reasonable cause for discrimination"); Richstone &
Russell, "Shutting the Gate: Gay Civil Rights and the Supreme Court of Canada"
(1981) 27 McGill L.J. 92; Black, "Gay Alliance Toward Equality v. Vancouver
Sun" (1979) 17 O.H.L.J. 649; Kopyto, "The Gay Alliance Case Reconsidered"
(1980) 18 O.H.L.J. 639.
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minority opinions of the Supreme Court accepted without comment
the notion that an accused charged with murder should be entitled to
raise a provocation defence if the murder followed a "homosexual
advance" by the deceased. As Mison has argued:
The continued use and acceptance of this defense sends a message to juries
and the public that if someone makes a homosexual overture, such an advance
may be sufficient provocation to kill that person. This reinforces both the
notions that gay men are to be afforded less respect than heterosexual men,
and that revulsion and hostility are natural reactions to homosexual behav-
iour.173
In sum, a review of the Supreme Court decisions reveals that they
have been characterized by a failure to challenge or even comment
upon the discrimination experienced by gay men and lesbians, by the
repetition of stereotypical attitudes to gay men and gay sexuality, and
by the tacit or explicit approval of heterosexist legal rules. Thus, the
Mossop majority's assertion of judicial expertise on questions of dis-
crimination against gay men and lesbians is not borne out by an ex-
amination of the Supreme Court's institutional record. The most pow-
erful message sent out by that record thus far, including the majority
judgments in Mossop, is that the Court is disinclined to take on the
responsibilities that such asserted expertise ought to entail. It appears
that "the province of the judiciary" is a realm in which gay men and
lesbians are not yet welcomed as equal citizens.
172 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 313.
173 Mison, "Homophobiain Manslaughter: The Homosexual Advance as Insufficient
Provocation" (1992) 80 Cal. L. Rev. 133, 135-6. For a discussion of thirteen cases
in which the homosexual advance defence was entertained by Canadian courts,
see Eaton, Theorizing Sexual Orientation (LL.M. Thesis; Queen's Univ., 1991)
at 63-8.
